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This research examines the challenges of early cost estimation of infrastructure projects 
within the UK with a focus on why cost overruns are such a persistent issue.  The research 
was carried out by an investigation of existing literature surrounding early estimation in 
construction, characteristics of UK-based infrastructure projects and cost overruns within 
infrastructure projects.  The data were collected through fourteen semi-structured 
interviews with estimating professionals who work predominantly on infrastructure 
projects across the UK.  The key findings were that the early estimation process consists 
of an intricate system of hard and soft information exchange from the many involved 
parties due to the social and political nature of infrastructure projects; this provides many 
challenges for the estimator.  This led to the idea that an estimate is actually a soft input 
itself and should not be taken as a hard numerical figure but something which requires 
human interpretation.  Moreover, these challenges are heightened by the number of 
unknowns and uncertainties that are again part of the very nature of large scale 
infrastructure projects.  This is difficult to address as it is the process of converting soft 
information into hard information and when soft information is hardened it will inevitably 
lose some of its information or context.  Unfortunately, cost estimates have become to be 
accepted as hard information even when it is known to be soft information that requires 
interpretation and sense making. 
Keywords: cost overruns, early estimation, infrastructure projects, soft information 
INTRODUCTION 
Siemiatycki (2015) suggests that infrastructure is the fundamental element for 
successfully accomplishing social equality, economic growth and environmental 
sustainability.  It was estimated that construction work within the UK would rise in both 
2017 and 2018, and would reach for the first-time levels equivalent to those before the 
UK's 2008 recession.  This has been attributed to a recent increase in infrastructure 
projects across the UK; it has been forecasted that infrastructure will be the leading 
growth area for the UK’s construction industry for the first time in five years with the 
work set to increase by 56.9% by 2019 (Plimmer, 2016).  Literature highlights that 
infrastructure projects across the globe persistently experience cost overruns and the UK 
is no exception to this.  The infrastructure cost review (HM Treasury, 2010a) highlights 
that the average outturns for the UK’s infrastructure projects are much higher than their 
European counterparts and argues that these greater costs were generally experienced 
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early on in projects before construction had commenced.  Several researchers point out 
that those who carry out construction cost estimations are dependent upon either their 
previous experience or a variety of cost information.  This research attempts to explore 
and present the challenges of early cost estimation of infrastructure projects from an 
information perspective. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Infrastructure Projects 
Frischmann (2012) believes infrastructure is imperative for both social and economic 
development but cautions that infrastructure assets are no short-term commitment and can 
come with profound consequences for the public.  He further asserts that infrastructure 
assets fundamentally mould intricate systems of social activity within society, including 
both economic and political systems.  Additionally, governmental funding of 
infrastructure projects can have a variety of economic benefits as it helps to generate 
employment within the related industries and it can attract capital investment; hence, they 
are political. 
Although infrastructure is set to increase social and economic development, it is not 
without its issues.  Latham (1994) highlights that there is no such thing as a risk-free 
construction project and whilst we can manage, reduce, share, transfer, or take risks, it is 
imperative that we do not ignore it.  However, Beckers and Stegemann (2013) contend 
that it is common for large infrastructure projects to experience poor risk management 
throughout their project lifecycle due to inadequate planning.  This is also reflected in the 
infrastructure cost review by HM Treasury (2010a) as it described how contingency and 
risk budgets are often overlooked and as a result are given inadequate budgets.  This 
inadequacy of contingency could be attributed to the fact that a considerable percentage 
of the risk exposure is affiliated with undefined uncertainties in the conceptual stage and 
these risks are undetermined at the time of carrying out the early estimates and may not 
be realised until detailed designs have been produced or even when construction has 
commenced (HM Treasury, 2015).  In theory, the quantity of these undetermined 
uncertainties should reduce following the use of quantified risk assessments as the design 
and project maturity progresses but this does not necessarily help the early stage 
estimates. 
Early Cost Advice 
Cost advice is provided to the client throughout a project’s life-cycle and is defined as a 
technical procedure that utilises the full extent of information and materials that are 
available to generate estimations and predictions of the total cost of completing work in a 
specific time (Kwakye, 1994).  A number of academics such as Serpell (2004) and Trost 
and Oberlender (2003) agree that the most valuable cost advice for aiding the client in 
decision-making is provided in the initial project stages when levels of certainty are 
extremely low.  Other academics (Akintoye and Fitzgerald, 2000; Love et al., 2002; 
Oberlender and Trost, 2001) attribute this to early cost advice being considered the initial 
step in the practice of cost management; they claim that it provides a thorough insight 
into the information surrounding a project, highlights the consequences that design 
choices have on the project cost and determines the client’s likely expenditure.  The early 
cost estimation is required by several parties such as the client, contractor and designers; 
it serves several purposes including establishing the initial budget for the project, 
determining the practicability of the project and enabling alternative design options to be 
evaluated on a financial level (Sonmez, 2004). 
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Love et al., (2002) argue that an accurate and reliable cost estimate for a project in the 
early stages can lead to sound financial advice, which is a major factor which determines 
project success.  But historically construction projects have experienced cost overruns at 
the feasibility stage (Betteridge, 1992).  Additionally, Langmaid (2003) argues that in 
order to reduce the likelihood of inaccuracies occurring within early cost estimation, an 
in-depth understanding of the client’s requirements is necessary from the very beginning 
of the project.  However, Sonmez (2004) believes that since the level of design 
information available is minimal and the scope of the project is still unconfirmed, early 
cost estimates are anticipated to be inaccurate and lacking in precision.  Aibinu and Pasco 
(2008) conducted a more recent study and found no improvements in the accuracy of 
early stage cost estimates from historical projects.  Not surprisingly, many clients feel that 
the quality of the advice is inadequate (Ellis and Turner, 1986). 
Information Requirements for Early Cost Advice 
The information required at the conceptual stage is client led; an outline brief is required 
to identify the client’s needs for the project and there should be a specification, design 
drawings and a list of abnormalities.  Abdul-kadir and Price (1995) maintain that in actual 
fact the outline brief tends to contain a high level of the client’s general requirements and 
much less of the specific exhaustive requirements.  Eldin and Hikle (2003) summarise 
that the essential goal of the briefing stage is to develop a profound understanding of both 
the construction project and the client’s prioritised requirements.  They argue that this can 
potentially omit or ease design errors and thus the frequency of change orders once 
construction has commenced; in turn, this will reduce the likelihood of cost overruns. 
Archetypally, cost advice is dependent on a variety of documentation produced by several 
different parties including: Design information, internal company data, historical data 
from sources such as the Building Cost Information Service (BCIS), manufacturer and 
supplier publications, trade magazines, and expert advice (O’Brien, 1994; Love et al., 
2002 and Arab, 2011).  Traditionally, when offering cost advice, professionals strongly 
rely upon previous experiences and personal judgement (Akintoye and Fitzgerald, 2000).  
According to Lees and Fortune (1996), the issue with this practice is that cost consultants 
within construction inherently make misjudgements. 
Challenges of Early Cost Estimation in Infrastructure Projects 
In a study involving 245 large dams (total cost of USD 353 billion in 2010 prices) that 
were constructed between 1934 and 2007 across sixty-five different countries, Ansar et 
al., (2014) found that 75% experienced a cost overrun with the average overrun at 90%, 
and there have not any improvement in budget accuracy over the seventy-three years that 
the data spanned.  Siemiatycki (2015) claims that there is evidence indicating a positive 
correlation between project size and both cost and time overruns; infrastructure projects 
tend to be relatively large which could suggest why they make up a high proportion of the 
projects that do overrun.  He identifies three core reasons for the occurrence of cost and 
time overruns: Optimism bias, technical obstacles, and tactical falsifications.  Siemiatycki 
(2015) claims that when stakeholders speak about the causes for their project 
experiencing cost overruns, the technical obstacles tend to be at the forefront of 
discussion; this is to be expected as it reduces their level of accountability for the overrun.  
Most of the technical obstacles can be predicted and managed, especially with 
experienced professionals creating the budgets.  Siemiatycki (2015) argues that if cost 
overruns were unpredictable then a normal distribution would be expected over a large 
sample.  However, it has already been identified from aforementioned studies that the 
distribution is greatly skewed.  In addition to this, large projects are usually delivered by 
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experienced professionals within the field so if the only causes were technical failures 
then it would be expected that the volume and magnitude of overruns would decline over 
time as the industry implements improvements to ensure more accurate forecasting and 
more efficient methods for project delivery; but this is not the case.  However, due to the 
optimistic human nature, even with experience these professionals tend to underestimate 
both time and costs, meaning most megaprojects are destined to overrun.  In addition to 
this, tactical falsifications can occur for promotional purposes in order to secure funding 
and approval for the project.  However, some individuals such as Samset (2010) claim 
that early tactical underestimation rarely affects cost overruns as he argues that overruns 
are not relative to these early estimates that are used to seek initial approval but the final 
approved budget. 
Muchenagumbo (2015) advises that infrastructure projects are often unique, once in a 
lifetime projects.  As a result, initial estimates may be produced for each project at 
different stages within the project’s life-cycle and projects that are at the same stage 
within the cycle can have extreme variance in terms of their uncertainties affecting the 
project costs (HM Treasury, 2015).  However, history highlights that similar types of 
projects tend to face the same categories of uncertainty; this suggests that the use of 
appropriate historical data will enable the desired understanding of the cost implications 
for the project, even within early stage estimating.  Unfortunately, this does not 
completely solve the issue as risk and uncertainties may be inadequately represented 
because of early cost estimates being susceptible to powerful stakeholder’s desires and 
demands (HM Treasury, 2015).  Furthermore, Williams (2009) identifies that 
infrastructure projects are susceptible to “scope creep”, where the project, client and even 
specification and design requirements change during the process of delivery.  Accurate 
estimating becomes even more of a challenge due to this characteristic where the scope is 
often indeterminate and susceptible to change for a considerable proportion of the project 
lifecycle.  In order to consider this within the cost estimate a contingency is required to 
facilitate the instigation of such changes (HM Treasury, 2015). 
Another challenge that can affect a cost estimate is that many public infrastructure 
projects are susceptible to optimism bias.  Lovallo and Khaneman (2003) suggest that 
most individuals are greatly optimistic the majority of the time.  They further suggest that 
cognitive research has determined a variety of reasons for this such as an inclination for 
people to exaggerate their own talents and their degree of control over a situation.  People 
will happily accept recognition for positive results and will even de-emphasise the 
contribution of luck and chance in achieving the result; whilst attributing any negative 
occurrences to external factors such as bad weather.  Organisations can often intensify 
these tendencies of over optimism; since there is often strong internal competition 
employees are encouraged to accentuate the auspicious factors of any proposals they 
make to improve the chances of their proposal being selected.  These early proposals 
often act as anchors and lay the foundations for any future financial or technical estimates 
that are produced, meaning the estimates will be plagued with this over-optimism.  Some 
organisations even praise optimistic estimates whilst pessimistic ones are regarded as 
negativity; this can hinder an organisation’s capacity for critical thinking.  In 
combination, the natural human tendency of optimism along with implicit organisational 
intimidation for positive outcomes results in a persistent underestimation of costs. 
There are many stakeholders within infrastructure projects who will benefit either in 
terms of status or financially, from the successful delivery of a distinctive public works 
project; yet these individuals will experience no direct repercussions or accountability if 
overruns occur.  Flyvbjerg et al., (2002) reject technical reasons as a cause for cost 
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overruns technical faults can be accounted for in appropriate contingency budgets as it is 
possible to adequately predict the risk based on historical projects and data.  But they 
view tactical falsification and over-optimism as the key facets in causing cost overruns.  
They classify two causes of cost overruns as “fools” or “liars”.  The “fools” are those that 
are over optimistic and may overlook the significance of certain risks and uncertainties 
and the “liars” are the selfish individuals fuelled by greed, seeking to deceive the public 
to get a project started for their own gain.  Their evidence suggested that cost estimates 
used for project approval decisions are greatly and strategically deceptive and tactically 
falsified.  However, these findings have been questioned by Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui 
(2018). 
RESEARCH METHOD 
The goal of the research is to understand what is happening within infrastructure costing 
at the early stages and to determine what is unique within the infrastructure to be causing 
the high volume of cost overruns compared with other types of construction.  Due to the 
social and political nature of infrastructure projects within the UK upon which the study 
is based, the reality of what goes on is intersubjective.  Therefore this study adopted an 
interview method in order to investigate this issue.  The data were collected through 
fourteen semi-structured interviews with estimating professionals who work 
predominantly on infrastructure projects across the UK.  Professionals with more than 
fifteen years of cost management experience within UK-based infrastructure projects 
were selected for this purpose.  These interviewees had a total of 265 years of experience 
in estimating within infrastructure projects.  Interview method allowed the collection of 
in-depth experiences of early estimation and its challenges from the selected 
professionals.  Interview with each professional took approximately 40-50 minutes.  
Within semi structured interviews open-ended questions were also employed to get a 
wider view of the situation.  Interview questions were focused on finding out current 
industry practices and views on factors affecting estimation and methods used, cost 
overruns, project scope, information requirements, representation of risk, uncertainties 
and apportionment of contingencies, optimism-bias and strategic falsification.  The 
collected data were transcribed and coded to establish emerging themes.  An information 
perspective is taken to analyse data emerging from various themes.  A rich picture (See 
Figure 1) was then used to capture these themes and explore the relationship between 
participants and emerging themes and create new ideas. 
Analysis and Findings 
A variety of factors that can affect estimation were put forward by interviewees.  
Interviewee 1 named ground conditions as the most important factor for affecting 
estimates.  Contrarily, interviewee 3 believed that ground conditions are only of concern 
to engineers.  However, there was a common consensus across the interviewees that there 
is a need for thorough site investigation and ground surveys to be carried out prior to 
early estimates to reduce uncertainties.  Interviewee 11 identified that lack of information 
is a big issue and it can affect the accuracy of estimates, whilst interviewee 7 feels that the 
stakeholders need to take a more realistic view of what an estimate actually is.  Some of 
the less senior interviewees from the contractors’ side emphasized that even though they 
know there are a variety of factors that can influence their estimate, they would not seek 
to allow for these within their estimates unless they were specified in the client’s brief or 
design drawings.  Interviewee 5 justified this for legal reasons by saying, “in lots of 
infrastructure projects designers take the lead.  From an estimating point of view, you 
rarely step away from design because if you do, you are embodying yourself in the design 
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and you have to be very, very careful [as] if it’s a failure then all of a sudden you’re 
liable”. 
All the interviewees agreed that stakeholders can affect estimates and proposed a variety 
of reasons for this.  Interviewees 3, 5, 8 and 10 attribute it to stakeholder’s change of 
mind or imposing conditions, whether it be public bodies or end user stakeholders.  
However, interviewee 7 did not put the entire onus on the client and attributed client led 
alterations to poor communication.  Interviewee 11 even discussed how sometimes if an 
influential stakeholder has a figure in mind you may be encouraged to go with that figure, 
but it will not be an accurate estimate of the works.  In addition to this, Interviewee 4 
discussed other stakeholders who can have influence such as landowners, planning 
authorities, highways authorities and statutory bodies who can impose conditions and 
fees.  Furthermore, interviewee 2 summarised this power related relationship saying, “you 
have less control in public sector schemes due to the high number of stakeholders 
involved, who want their input accepted”. 
Most interviewees agreed that they required some form of client led pre-tender 
information from the design team to start an estimation.  This included: A brief, 
architectural drawings, structural drawings, civils drawings, engineer’s calculations, 
material specification, location drawings for site access, schedule of works, input from 
highways, ground investigation details, special requirements, local regulations, site risks, 
planning permission details, land ownership information and the client’s programme with 
an idea of the end date.  Moreover, interviewee 7 stated that “you want as much as you 
can from the scheme in order to give an accurate price, the problem is you don’t often get 
it”.  Interviewee 5 echoes this concern for adequate information not being there when it is 
needed.  In addition to this, interviewees agreed that some sort of cost data and 
knowledge was required from a similar scheme, whether it be from previous experience, 
and historic data from pricing books or in-house data from their own company or other 
companies.  Interviewee 7 identified that it can also be dependent on what type of 
contract terms are priced against.  Most of the interviewees stated they have in-house 
records at their current companies with the exception of interviewee 11.  Interviewees 4 
and 8 believed their in-house information to be dependable as it is actual outturn costs.  
However, interviewees 1, 2 and 9 stated that they used estimated costs and believed it to 
be reputable if the final project cost came in within 5 - 10% of the estimated cost. 
Whilst most of the interviewees maintained that the current methods for representing risk 
within the early estimates are inadequate, they feel there is no alternative.  Interviewee 4 
supported this stating, “…at a stage where you haven’t got full design, I think a 
percentage on the estimated contract is the best you can do really”.  However, 
interviewees 1 and 9 both offer a potential improvement of risk representation by getting 
input from professionals who work specifically within each identified risk area. 
Discussion: Hard and Soft Information 
The rich picture in figure 1 presents findings from the data analysis and attempts to depict 
the information transfer of the early estimation process.  Liberti and Petersen (2017) 
define hard information as quantitative information which can be conveyed easily in a 
detached manner and the data collection process has no effect on the informational 
content of the data.  Meanwhile, Wiebe (2010) explains that soft information is subjective 
information that is based on feelings and perception.  As can be seen from Figure 1, the 
estimating process for infrastructure projects is fundamentally built up of a number of 
hard and soft informational transactions. 
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Figure 1: Informational Transfer in the Early Estimation Process 
Furthermore, Bertomeu and Marinovic (2016) also determine that inaccuracies are more 
likely when soft and hard information are provided in unison; they argue that the 
combination of hard and soft information will make all information soft.  Due to the 
nature of infrastructure projects being driven by social demand and biases in the political 
environment, there is a high volume of stakeholders involved; thus, subjective, soft 
informational inputs will be coming in from all directions.  Therefore, an estimate will 
always be a soft information output.  Moreover, Liberti and Peterson (2017) suggest that 
if some of the information input is qualitative it cannot all be represented by a single 
numerical figure; instead, an experienced individual needs to make a judgment call.  This 
indicates that an estimate should not be taken as an absolute figure for project costs but as 
soft information which requires human interpretation. 
An issue with an estimate being largely made up of soft information is that soft 
information is more susceptible to manipulation (Godbillon-Camus and Godlewski, 
2005).  This can stem from the stakeholders having different end goals; whilst the client 
wants to spend as little as possible, the contractor wants to make as much as possible, the 
politicians want popularity and for their desired schemed to go ahead and the engineers 
want to produce something practical and picturesque.  Subsequently, this can often lead to 
a non-collaborative and disjointed information exchange process.  Since the data can be 
easily manipulated strategic falsification and optimism-bias can creep in; the findings 
suggest that contractors seek to price a job as low as possible (while following the 
standard of estimation) and may misrepresent information.  Additionally, clients can be 
too over-optimistic with timescale and costs and politicians often seem to ignore the risks 
and accentuate the positives of a scheme. 
Additionally, uncertainties and unknowns plague the early stages of an infrastructure 
project (as depicted in Figure 1) and affect the estimation process.  They too are based on 
soft information which also leaves them open to manipulation from stakeholders.  
However, the findings support that they can be reduced through appropriate research from 
clients such as ground surveys and site investigations.  Nevertheless, these are not often 
carried out prior to estimation which could be due to reluctance on the client’s part to 
spend money.  Furthermore, the majority of the participants in the primary research felt 
that uncertainties and risks were not adequately represented within estimates.  This is 
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difficult to address as it is the process of converting soft information into hard 
information and when soft information is hardened it will inevitably lose some of its 
information or context (Liberti and Peterson, 2017). 
Thus, embedded within the very foundations of the estimating process for infrastructure 
projects is a fragmented, soft information exchange that is open to manipulation from 
many stakeholders involved.  Hence infrastructure projects continually experience such a 
high volume of scope change throughout the project.  Due to this very nature of the 
projects, soft data is a key element of the estimation process.  However, budgets produced 
by estimates has become to be accepted as hard information even when it is known to be 
soft information that requires interpretation and sense making. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Cost overruns have become an accepted norm within the UK construction industry’s 
infrastructure projects for a variety of reasons.  Firstly, the early estimation process for 
infrastructure projects involves numerous data exchanges between various interested 
parties, which makes the whole process extremely intricate.  Furthermore, due to the 
nature of infrastructure projects, there are a high number of interested parties within this 
intricate system of data exchange who can have an effect on the estimation process both 
explicitly or indirectly.  This also means there is a high volume of soft information going 
into the estimation process which is susceptible to manipulation for personal gain.  
Hence, a cost estimate is essentially a soft informational output, thus it needs to be made 
sense of to provide meaning; therefore it should be considered as a way of providing 
advice to the client, not an absolute figure of anticipated project costs.  Additionally, there 
will always be a high volume of uncertainties and unknowns on infrastructure projects 
and whilst appropriate research can reduce these, they will never be eradicated.  These are 
both factors that you cannot get away from as they are inherent in the nature of the work.  
Therefore, even though cost overruns come with connotations of poor estimation as the 
literature review highlighted, it is not necessarily the case and estimators do not deserve 
to be stigmatised for it. 
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